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A Free Speech Tale of Two County Clerk Refusals 
CAROLINE MALA CORBIN?? 
The ever-expanding Free Speech Clause has made possible claims that 
would have been unthinkable until recently. This symposium Essay 
examines the compelled speech claims of two hypothetical county clerks 
who believe that marriage should be limited to unions between one man 
and one woman, and who argue that forcing them to issue marriage 
licenses to gay and lesbian couples compels them to speak in favor of 
same-sex marriage in violation of the Free Speech Clause.  
 
When a government employee such as a county clerk speaks, she may 
not be speaking as just a private individual. She may also be speaking 
as the government. This governmental component affects each side of 
the speech versus equality analysis. First, the Free Speech Clause 
interests in speech are weaker (sometimes to the point of 
extinguishment) when the speech is not purely private. Second, to the 
extent the government employee’s conduct is the government’s, then it 
amounts to state action, and the Equal Protection Clause is triggered. 
Part II addresses the free speech claims of a county clerk who is 
terminated after she informs a same-sex couple that by reason of her 
beliefs, she cannot grant them a marriage license. The outcome here is 
straightforward: she loses. Because her refusal will be treated as the 
government’s own, her individual free speech interests are at their 
lowest while the government’s equal protection interests are at their 
highest. Part III addresses the free speech claims of a clerk who has 
found a coworker willing to cover for her, but her supervisor declines 
to accommodate her and instead fires her for refusing to do her job. The 
analysis here is more complicated, as it raises questions about 
expressive conduct, official duties, and expressive harms. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The ever-expanding Free Speech Clause has made possible claims that 
would have been unthinkable until recently. In particular, businesses have 
challenged regulations that would not have even been on the free speech radar 
in earlier times.1 Among them are claims by commercial wedding vendors that 
public accommodations laws banning discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation violate their free speech rights.2 Private business entities are not 
alone. Government employees have made similar complaints. Most notoriously, 
after the Supreme Court held that same-sex marriage bans were 
unconstitutional, Kim Davis, a county clerk in Kentucky, refused to issue any 
marriage licenses rather than grant them to same-sex couples.3  
                                                                                                                     
 1 See, e.g., Tana Ganeva, Secretive Drug Supplier Insists that Selling Lethal Injection 
Drugs Is Free Speech, RAW STORY (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.rawstory.com/2016/09/ 
secretive-drug-supplier-insists-that-selling-lethal-injection-drugs-is-free-speech/ 
[https://perma.cc/4FJJ-G9TJ]. 
 2 See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Speech or Conduct: The Free Speech Claims of 
Wedding Vendors, 65 EMORY L.J. 251 (2015) (analyzing free speech claims of wedding 
vendors with religious objections to complying with antidiscrimination laws). 
 3 Sarah Kaplan & James Higdon, The Defiant Kim Davis, the Ky. Clerk Who Refuses 
To Issue Gay Marriage Licenses, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/09/02/meet-kim-davis-the-ky-
clerk-who-defying-the-supreme-court-refuses-to-issue-gay-marriage-licenses/?utm_term= 
.8f4e309be405 [https://perma.cc/B4KG-Y42P]. 
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One might think that the more natural constitutional argument would be that 
requiring clerks to serve same-sex couples violates their religious liberty, since 
their core argument is that participating in these unions contravenes their deeply 
held religious beliefs. However, ever since the Supreme Court decided 
Employment Division v. Smith,4 neutral laws of general applicability do not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause, and few would dispute that antidiscrimination 
statutes qualify as neutral, generally applicable laws. After all, their goal is to 
promote equality, not target religion.5 
Accordingly, government employees, like businesses and business owners 
before them, may turn to the Free Speech Clause. Generally speaking, under the 
Free Speech Clause, the government may not censor speech it dislikes or compel 
speech it prefers.6 Religious objectors to antidiscrimination requirements argue 
that forcing them to serve gay and lesbian couples violates their free speech 
rights by compelling them to express approval of same-sex marriage.7  
There are notable differences between a business owner and a public 
employee challenging, on free speech grounds, the requirement that everyone 
have equal access to their services. In particular, when a government employee 
speaks, she may not be speaking as just a private individual. She may also be 
speaking as the government.8 This governmental component affects each side 
of the speech versus equality analysis. First, the Free Speech Clause interests in 
speech are weaker (sometimes to the point of extinguishment) when the speech 
is not purely private. Second, to the extent the government employee’s conduct 
is the government’s, then it amounts to state action, and the Equal Protection 
Clause is triggered.  
This Essay examines the compelled speech claims of two hypothetical 
county clerks who believe that marriage should be limited to unions between 
one man and one woman, and argue that forcing them to issue marriage licenses 
to gay and lesbian couples compels them to speak in favor of same-sex marriage 
in violation of the Free Speech Clause.  
                                                                                                                     
 4 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990). 
 5 Potential “First Amendment Freedom Act” claims, should the proposed law pass, are 
beyond the scope of this Essay. I note, however, that the law likely violates both the 
Establishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Barber v. Bryant, 193 
F. Supp. 3d 677, 688 (S.D. Miss. 2016) (holding that a similar Mississippi law, Protecting 
Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act, violated both those clauses), 
rev’d on other grounds, 860 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2017).  
 6 Black letter law is that content-based regulations of speech are subject to strict 
scrutiny. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015). Slightly different 
rules may apply when dealing with commercial speech. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985). And as this Essay will discuss, the rules 
also differ for government employees. See infra Part II.A. 
 7 See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 283 (Colo. App. 2015), 
cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 
2290 (2017); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 60 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014). 
 8 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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Part II addresses the free speech claims of a county clerk who is terminated 
after she informs a couple that, by reason of her beliefs, she cannot grant them 
a license. The outcome here is straightforward: She loses. Because her refusal 
will be treated as the government’s own, her free speech interests are at their 
lowest while the government’s equal protection interests are at their highest. 
Part III addresses the free speech claims of a clerk who has found a coworker 
willing to cover for her, but her supervisor declines to accommodate her and 
instead fires her for refusing to do her job. The analysis here is more 
complicated.  
II. SCENARIO ONE:  
“I AM SORRY MA’AMS, YOU HAVE TO FIND SOMEONE ELSE.” 
In my first hypothetical, a government employee on duty refuses to provide 
a marriage license for a same-sex wedding, loses her job, and then brings a free 
speech claim. The hypothetical begins with a happy couple approaching the 
county clerk’s window to request a license. The clerk refuses on the ground that 
her deeply held religious beliefs prevent her from communicating approval of a 
sinful union. After the clerk is terminated, she brings a free speech claim against 
the county, arguing that, however unpopular her viewpoint may be, the 
government cannot force her to express approval of same-sex marriage. 
This case is fairly straightforward. The clerk ought to lose on at least two 
grounds. To start, under the government-employee speech doctrine, any speech 
connected to her refusal to issue marriage licenses is unprotected government 
speech and not protected private speech.9 Moreover, for the government to deny 
a marriage license to a same-sex couple violates the Equal Protection Clause.10 
A. Speech Analysis 
The speech rules for government employees differ from those that apply to 
private citizens. When public employees speak, they may speak not only for 
themselves, but also for the government.11 Consequently, government-
employee speech is less protected, and in certain circumstances, completely 
unprotected. In fact, despite the general trend towards ever-increasing free 
speech protection, the trend for government employees is to retract it, especially 
after Garcetti v. Ceballos.12 Garcetti held that government-employee speech 
                                                                                                                     
 9 Id. at 421. 
 10 Equal protection is not the only constitutional problem. See, e.g., Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015) (holding that bans on same-sex marriage violate 
the fundamental right to marriage protected by substantive due process).  
 11 Cf. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422–23 (2006) (“Official communications have official 
consequences . . . . [Government] [s]upervisors must ensure that their employees’ official 
communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer’s 
mission.”). 
 12 Id. 
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made fulfilling one’s job responsibilities is not covered by the Free Speech 
Clause: “We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their 
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from 
employer discipline.”13  
Garcetti suggests, although it does not explicitly state, that government-
employee speech pursuant to official duties is government speech.14 Indeed, one 
of the dissents complained that “[t]he majority accepts the fallacy . . . that any 
statement made within the scope of public employment is (or should be treated 
as) the government’s own speech.”15  
When a member of the public approaches a clerk at the county office to 
request a license, and the clerk responds, the clerk is responding in her capacity 
as a government official. The clerk is denying a license on behalf of the 
government, and so her speech as the government’s representative is 
government speech. Thus, even assuming that the clerk’s conduct amounts to 
speech—and there are plenty of reasons to think it does not16—it would not be 
private speech. Government speech, of course, does not trigger the Free Speech 
Clause.17 Rather, the Free Speech Clause is meant to protect private individuals 
from the government.18 Therefore, the first county clerk’s free speech claim 
would fail.  
B. Equal Protection Analysis 
As suggested by the free speech analysis, the clerk’s refusal to provide a 
marriage license is not a private action. To the contrary, the clerk’s rejection 
amounts to state action, and therefore triggers the Equal Protection Clause. 
Although the presence or absence of state action can be opaque,19 there is no 
doubt of its existence here. Public employees discharging their official duties 
will be treated as the state for state action purposes.20 As the Supreme Court has 
observed, “generally, a public employee acts under color of state law while 
                                                                                                                     
 13 Id. at 421. Pushing against this retraction, however, is Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 
2369, 2378 (2014), which held that “[t]ruthful testimony under oath by a public employee 
outside the scope of his ordinary job duties” was not government speech. Id. 
 14 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
 15 Id. at 436 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 16 See infra Part III.A.1.  
 17 See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245–
46 (2015) (“[G]overnment statements (and government actions and programs that take the 
form of speech) do not normally trigger the First Amendment rules designed to protect the 
marketplace of ideas.”); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009). 
 18 Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 467 (“The Free Speech Clause restricts government 
regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.”). 
 19 Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s 
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) (describing state action doctrine as a 
“conceptual disaster area”). 
 20 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988). 
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acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to 
state law.”21 Thus, this refusal is a paradigmatic example of state action.  
Furthermore, denying equal access to marriage on the basis of sexual 
orientation now constitutes a paradigmatic equal protection violation. In both 
United States v. Windsor22 and Obergefell v. United States,23 the Supreme Court 
held that same-sex marriage bans violated the Equal Protection Clause, and that 
denying a marriage license is essentially denying same-sex couples the right to 
marry.24 That marriage is a fundamental substantive due process right25 only 
makes the equal protection case stronger, as Justice Kennedy has underscored 
the “synergy”26 and “interrelation”27 of the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses.28 In short, a government official who informs a couple at the county 
clerk’s office that she will not grant them a marriage license not only cannot 
invoke the Free Speech Clause but also violates the Equal Protection Clause.29  
III. SCENARIO TWO:  
“BOSS, SOMEONE ELSE HAS OFFERED TO COVER FOR ME.” 
In my second hypothetical, another county clerk who opposes same-sex 
marriage refuses to provide marriage licenses to gay and lesbian couples, but 
this one has colleagues willing to cover for her. That is, sympathetic coworkers 
offer to discharge her marriage-license responsibilities when same-sex couples 
are involved. The government, however, declines to provide the accommodation 
and terminates the clerk for refusing to do her job. She too brings a compelled 
speech claim. How has the analysis changed?  
                                                                                                                     
 21 Id. 
 22 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013). 
 23 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). 
 24 Id. at 2602 (“The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty 
promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee 
of the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 25 See id. at 2604 (holding that “the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the 
liberty of the person”). 
 26 Id. at 2603. 
 27 Id. 
 28 See id. at 2602–03 (“The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are 
connected in a profound way.”). 
 29 Indeed, the Sixth Circuit ruled against Kim Davis in part because “it cannot be 
defensibly argued that the holder of the Rowan County Clerk’s office, apart from who 
personally occupies that office, may decline to act in conformity with the United States 
Constitution as interpreted by a dispositive holding of the United States Supreme Court.” 
Miller v. Davis, No. 15-5880, 2015 WL 10692640, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 26, 2015). 
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A. Speech Analysis 
1. Is It Speech? 
In the first hypothetical, I assumed that the Free Speech Clause covers the 
act of issuing a marriage license.30 This assumption does not necessarily hold. 
As mentioned earlier, the Free Speech Clause protects against compelled speech 
as well as censored speech, so the fact that the county clerk’s claim involves 
compulsion rather than censorship is not an issue.31 However, the Free Speech 
Clause generally protects speech rather than conduct; only if the conduct has an 
expressive component will it trigger free speech protection.32 Is granting a 
license the type of expressive conduct that merits speech (as opposed to 
religious) protection? What, if anything, does this act communicate?  
The objecting clerk, paraphrasing bakers who refuse to bake cakes for gay 
and lesbian couples, would likely argue that “compelling [her] to [issue a 
marriage license] for a same-sex wedding is equivalent to forcing [her] to 
‘speak’ in favor of same-sex weddings.”33  
The clerk’s interpretation, however, is not dispositive. As the Supreme 
Court has pointed out, “We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless 
variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the 
conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”34 All conduct risks becoming 
expressive conduct if only the intent of the speaker is considered. Consequently, 
the Court insists that to be expressive conduct, the conduct’s particular message 
must be understood by the audience as well.35  
                                                                                                                     
 30 See supra Part II. 
 31 See, e.g., W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (Murphy, J., 
concurring) (stating that the First Amendment protects “both the right to speak freely and 
the right to refrain from speaking at all”).  
 32 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (per curiam). 
 33 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. CR 2013-0008, at 7 (Colo. Admin. Ct. Dec. 
6, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/initial_decision_case_no._ 
cr_2013-0008.pdf [https://perma.cc/E54R-MFBA], aff’d, No. CR 2013-0008 (Colo. Civil 
Rights Comm’n May 30, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/ 
masterpiece_--_commissions_final_order.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH5G-3WCD], aff’d, 370 
P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), aff’d, 370 P.3d 282 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017). Notably, 
this claim is different from clerks’ religious claim that providing a form facilitates or enables 
sinful conduct. The claim here is not that providing a form facilitates conduct that their 
religion condemns, but rather that it communicates approval of that conduct.  
 34 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); see also Rumsfeld v. Forum for 
Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65–66 (2006) (repeating the same concern 
as in O’Brien).  
 35 Whether conduct has a legally recognized expressive element is (often but not 
always) determined by the test laid out in Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 
(1974) (per curiam): conduct is deemed expressive if the actor intended to express a 
particularized message and that message is understood by the audience as such. 
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Conduct that is “inherently expressive” is obviously easier for an audience 
to read as communicating a message. In fact, recent case law suggests that an 
act must be “inherently expressive” in order to trigger free speech scrutiny.36 
Handing out government forms is not inherently expressive in the way that 
burning an American flag is.37 Nevertheless, conduct that is not inherently 
expressive may present as expressive in the right context. For example, sitting 
is not inherently expressive, but sitting at a segregated lunch counter may well 
be expressive.38  
That being said, generally when a county clerk furnishes you with a 
government form at a government office open to all and sundry, she does not 
communicate endorsement of the form’s subject matter. Consider all the forms 
available besides marriage licenses: divorce forms, death certificates, fictitious 
business name forms, business entity registration forms, quitclaim deed forms, 
forms for property tax exemptions and church exemptions, forms to contest 
driver’s license suspension, to name just a few. It cannot be that clerks approve 
of every divorce, every corporation, every property transfer, every religious 
organization, every challenge to a driver license suspension for which they hand 
out a form. We simply do not understand the act of providing an official 
government form as expressing approval of the conduct authorized by the form. 
Consequently, providing a marriage form at a county clerk’s office is not 
expressive conduct.  
In short, providing a form is just providing a form, not expressing a 
message.39 But even if it were covered speech, it is unlikely that it would be 
protected by the Free Speech Clause.  
                                                                                                                     
 36 See, e.g., Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66 (“[W]e have extended First Amendment 
protection only to conduct that is inherently expressive.”). 
 37 Cf., e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989) (discussing flag burning as 
expressive conduct). 
 38 See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 306 (1984) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting) (“[S]itting or standing is not conduct that an observer would normally construe 
as expressive conduct. However, for Negroes to stand or sit in a ‘whites only’ library in 
Louisiana in 1965 was powerfully expressive; in that particular context, those acts became 
‘monuments of protest’ against segregation.”); cf. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) 
(protesters at segregated library); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (protesters at 
segregated lunch counters). 
 39 Cf. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. CR 2013-0008, at 9 (Colo. Admin. Ct. 
Dec. 6, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/initial_decision_case_no._ 
cr_2013-0008.pdf [https://perma.cc/E54R-MFBA] (“[The bakers] have no free speech right 
to refuse because they were only asked to bake a cake, not make a speech.”), aff’d, No. CR 
2013-0008 (Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n May 30, 2014), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/masterpiece_--_commissions_ 
final_order.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH5G-3WCD], aff’d, 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), 
cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 
2290 (2017).  
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2. Whose Speech Is It? 
A county clerk at the county seat handing out government licenses to the 
public is a paradigmatic example of a county clerk acting “pursuant to official 
duties.”40 In this capacity, she represents the government, and any speech linked 
with this activity unquestionably amounts to government speech. But what if 
she refuses to issue licenses behind the scenes? Is this act still pursuant to official 
duties? This scenario differs in two ways from the paradigmatic example. First, 
it occurs outside the public eye. Second, it involves an omission rather than a 
commission. Do either of these differences make her speech (to the extent her 
refusal counts as “speech”) private rather than governmental?  
Either of these factors on its own would not make the government 
employee’s speech nongovernmental. Just because an employee’s duties do not 
involve direct interaction with the public does not mean that her performance of 
them is not “pursuant to official duties.” Garcetti itself, after all, involved an 
internal office memo.41 Consequently, that a government employee’s conduct 
occurs outside public view should not change the analysis. Nor should it matter 
if a clerk who is interacting with the public refuses to execute her official duties 
rather than performs them.42 Either way, she is the official face of the 
government, and therefore her refusal is a government refusal.  
What if the speech involves both—such as a clerk who refuses to fulfill her 
responsibilities to the public but also refuses behind the scenes—should that still 
be categorized as pure government speech with no free speech protection? In 
that case, perhaps it is possible to conceive of her refusal as occurring before 
she dons her government-employee hat. Once she wears her government-
employee hat, her conduct, as a government employee, is more likely to be 
conflated with the government. But if her refusal is viewed as occurring before 
the government-employee hat goes on, while she retains her private citizen 
status, perhaps her refusal might be considered private to some degree.  
This permutation presents a less open and shut case than the earlier ones. At 
the same time, the clerk’s free speech claim hinges on the message conveyed by 
her issuing licenses, something she does only in her capacity as a government 
official.43 Moreover, it still ultimately involves a county clerk’s actions with 
                                                                                                                     
 40 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (describing how government employee 
speech “pursuant to official duties” is not protected by the Free Speech Clause). 
 41 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006) (rejecting free speech claim by 
deputy district attorney who was punished after he criticized an affidavit used to procure a 
search warrant and recommended dismissal of a case because advising superiors on 
upcoming cases was part of his job responsibilities). 
 42 See supra Part II.A.  
 43 See Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 942 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (asking whether Kim 
Davis was acting as a citizen and answering: “The logical answer to this question is no, as 
the average citizen has no authority to issue marriage licenses.”). 
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regard to her official duties.44 At least doctrinally, that renders any speech 
associated with those duties governmental.45 In short, a clerk’s performance of 
her job responsibilities, or her refusal to perform them, is ultimately pursuant to 
official duties, and the government employee speech doctrine dictates that the 
refusal is a government refusal. 
B. Equal Protection Analysis 
Even assuming the county clerk’s refusal were speech, and even assuming 
it were partially private speech entitled to some protection, the government 
would not be obligated to accommodate the government employee if the 
accommodation itself violated the Equal Protection Clause. Whether it would 
or not is the focus of this subsection.  
1. State Action 
No equal protection analysis is necessary unless there is state action.46 
Notably, the state action in the second hypothetical is not (solely) the 
government employee’s refusal, but the government’s willingness to excuse that 
clerk from some of her official duties. Thus, the presence of state action does 
not depend on whether the clerk’s action or inaction amounts to government 
conduct.47 Rather, it is satisfied by the government’s decision to accommodate 
an employee’s belief that providing a marriage certificate compels her to express 
a message anathema to her.48  
                                                                                                                     
 44 Cf. Frank S. Ravitch, Complementary or Competing Freedoms: Government 
Officials, Religious Freedom, and LGBTQ Rights, 11 FIU L. REV. 163, 175 (2015) (“[T]he 
very issue arises from performance of government duties so any speech involved would be 
in the actors’ capacity as government officials or employees.”). 
 45 Cf. Glicksman v. N.Y.C. Envtl. Control Bd., 345 F. App’x 688, 690 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(finding that Administrative Law Judge’s failure to adhere to TLC [Taxi and Limousine 
Commision] adjudication procedure at inquest hearings was pursuant to official duties and 
therefore unprotected speech); Davis v. Chicago, 162 F. Supp. 3d 726, 732 (N.D. Ill. 2016) 
(holding investigator’s refusal to change investigative reports, which were made pursuant to 
his official duties, was not protected under the First Amendment). 
 46 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883). 
 47 If the clerk’s refusal is government action, then the equal protection analysis from 
Part I.B applies, and the equal protection analysis of the government’s accommodation is no 
longer needed.  
 48 Laws that expressly exempt objecting government employees present a more obvious 
example of this kind of state action. See, e.g., H.R. 1523, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016) 
(Mississippi’s “Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act”). 
I am focusing on accommodations made outside of the public eye (as opposed to laws that 
tend to be at the center of a storm of publicity) because they present a more complex equal 
protection question.  
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2. Harm 
One might argue that if a colleague volunteers to take over her coworker’s 
duties, then there is no harm, especially if the county clerk’s office continues to 
grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples without the public ever learning 
about the accommodations for some employees working in it. If there is no 
harm, whether it be material harm or expressive harm, then there is no equal 
protection violation. However, the risk of both types of harm is very much 
present.  
a. Material Harm 
If the government’s accommodation of protesting clerks resulted in an 
office without anyone willing to issue a license, so that a same-sex couple had 
to drive to another county to obtain one, the couple would clearly have suffered 
a material harm. Even if a coworker volunteers to step in, the material harm 
evaluation turns on exactly which duties are assumed. Services would still be 
equal if the colleague assumes responsibility for all marriage licenses. If the 
coworker is covering only the same-sex requests, however, allowing county 
clerks to opt out of providing licenses to gay and lesbian couples might create 
tangible obstacles—such as waiting until the replacement clerk comes on 
duty—that only same-sex couples have to face.49  
Several scholars have argued that the extra wait (or even the extra drive) is 
merely a minor inconvenience and does not amount to a true equal protection 
harm.50 Yet state action that disadvantages a suspect class on its face always 
triggers the Equal Protection Clause.51 While the degree of disparate impact 
matters for facially neutral state actions, the degree of disparate treatment has 
never mattered for state actions that are not neutral on their face. For example, 
if the state charged white couples $50.00 for their marriage licenses and charged 
black couples $50.01 for theirs, that differential treatment would trigger—and 
                                                                                                                     
 49 But cf. Slater v. Douglas Cty., 743 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1195 (D. Or. 2010) (“So long 
as the [same-sex] registration is processed in a timely fashion, the registrants have suffered 
no injury.”).  
 50 For example, Robin Fretwell Wilson would allow some delay or inconvenience, as 
long as it did not rise to the level of “hardship.” Robin Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial 
Burdens: The Case for Government Employee Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 5 
NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 318, 321–22, 334 (2010) (“This Article argues that government 
employees who have religious objections should be permitted to step aside from facilitating 
same-sex marriages when it poses no hardship for same-sex couples . . . . [T]he proposed 
hardship exemption will involve some line drawing; specifically, what will count as 
‘promptly’ or ‘inconvenience’ or ‘delay.’”); see also id. at 340 (arguing only “significant 
interference” would “trigger[] an Equal Protection violation”). 
 51 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (“[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to demand 
that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification 
subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.”).  
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likely violate—the Equal Protection Clause, even though the difference is a 
single penny. Consequently, if the government’s accommodation for its 
employees opposed to same-sex marriage means two clerks will provide 
marriage licenses to straight couples but only one to gay couples, that 
differential treatment is unlikely to be constitutional.  
Nor can it be maintained that classifications based on sexual orientation are 
not suspect. Gay and lesbian people satisfy the indicia of suspect classes: sexual 
orientation is rarely relevant to legitimate government purposes; there is a long 
history of discrimination against the LGBT community; and laws that harm 
them usually reflect a defect in the democratic process.52 Granted, neither 
Windsor nor Obergefell pinpoint what level of equal protection scrutiny applies 
to laws that disadvantage gays and lesbians.53 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
conducted some form of heightened scrutiny review.54 Had it been rational, the 
Court would have accepted rather than rejected the government’s proffered 
justifications.55 Consequently, state actions that facially discriminate on the 
basis of sexual orientation, particularly in the marriage context, will at the very 
least be subject to some kind of heightened scrutiny.  
If subject to heightened scrutiny, the state’s accommodation will probably 
fail to satisfy it. There is a strong presumption that the rationales given for 
obstacles to same-sex marriage are mere pretexts, suggesting that the state 
                                                                                                                     
 52 Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (discussing 
the potential for heightened judicial scrutiny of legislation directed at 
“religious, . . . national, . . . or racial minorities”); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 
313 (1976) (per curiam) (“[A] suspect class is one ‘saddled with such disabilities, or 
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position 
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political process.’”); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (rejecting heightened 
scrutiny for a group because “[a]s a historical matter, they have not been subjected to 
discrimination; they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that 
define them as a discrete group; and they are not a minority or politically powerless.”). 
 53 See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Interpreting Liberty and Equality Through the Lens of 
Marriage, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 107, 113 (2015) (noting that Obergefell lacks “any discussion 
of the tiers of review that have traditionally been necessary to an analysis under the Equal 
Protection Clause”).  
 54 See, e.g., Autumn L. Bernhardt, The Profound and Intimate Power of the Obergefell 
Decision: Equal Dignity As a Suspect Class, 25 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 1, 11 (2016) (“The 
Obergefell opinion did not use the magic words of ‘heightened scrutiny,’ but it is clear from 
the language and disposition of the case that the Supreme Court gave same-sex couples 
exactly the ruling and the underlying reasoning they asked for in their briefs.”). 
 55 Indeed, the majority barely acknowledged the justifications offered to support the 
challenged law. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2707 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“The majority . . . makes only a passing mention of the ‘arguments put forward’ 
by the Act’s defenders, and does not even trouble to paraphrase or describe them.”). 
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would lack even a legitimate—let alone important—justification for the 
accommodation.56 That was the conclusion in both Windsor and Obergefell.57 
 It is true that unlike the marriage equality cases, the state here arguably has 
an interest in protecting the free speech (and free exercise) rights of government 
employees. This interest, however, will be diluted by the extent that the 
provision of marriage licenses does not represent private but government 
speech—assuming it amounts to speech at all. If the government employee’s 
speech vis-à-vis marriage licenses is the government’s, then the Constitution 
does not reach it; or, if it is a mixture of public and private speech, the 
Constitution may not reach it with equal force. Against this diminished interest 
is not just the material harm that might result from government-enabled refusals 
but also the potential expressive harm. Thus, the final balancing must also 
consider the expressive harm associated with government accommodation of its 
representatives who refuse to serve members of an often-targeted suspect class. 
b. Expressive Harm 
Even if the material harm is slight, the expressive harm may not be. Under 
an expressivist view of equal protection, the harm to equality is caused by the 
expressive content of the challenged government action.58 The focus is on the 
message conveyed by the state’s conduct rather than its intent or its practical 
effect. State conduct—such as providing unequal service to protected class 
members—violates the Constitution’s guarantee of equality if it undermines the 
government’s duty to treat each person with equal dignity.59 That is, “the 
government may not express, in words or deeds, that it values some of us more 
than others.”60 For example, offering civil unions instead of marriages to mixed-
race or same-sex couples, even if the unions came with exactly the same tangible 
                                                                                                                     
 56 See id. at 2696 (majority opinion) (“[N]o legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose 
and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to 
protect in personhood and dignity.”); id. at 2710 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“By formally 
declaring anyone opposed to same-sex marriage an enemy of human decency, the majority 
arms well every challenger to a state law restricting marriage to its traditional definition. 
Henceforth those challengers will lead with this Court’s declaration that there is ‘no 
legitimate purpose’ served by such a law . . . .”).  
 57 See id. at 2707 (“The majority concludes that the only motive for this Act was the 
‘bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group’ . . . . It makes only a passing mention 
of the ‘arguments put forward’ by the Act’s defenders, and does not even trouble to 
paraphrase or describe them.”). 
 58 See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A 
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1533–45 (2000); Deborah Hellman, The 
Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000). 
 59 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Nonbelievers and Government Speech, 97 IOWA L. REV. 
347, 380–81 (2012). 
 60 Hellman, supra note 58, at 13. 
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benefits, would violate the Equal Protection Clause because it treats those 
couples as second-class citizens.61  
This expressivist strand has existed from the earliest Equal Protection 
Clause cases. In the nineteenth century case of Strauder v. West Virginia, the 
Supreme Court recognized that state-sponsored race discrimination harmed 
blacks not just because it denied them equal opportunity, but because it 
conveyed a message of second-class citizenship: “The very fact that colored 
people are singled out and expressly denied [equal access to jury duty] because 
of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully 
qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of 
their inferiority . . . .”62 Brown v. Board of Education likewise acknowledged 
the expressive injury that accompanies state discrimination.63  
Although post-Brown the Supreme Court retreated to a more limited view 
of the Equal Protection Clause,64 the expressive strand has reemerged in the 
marriage equality cases. When Justice Kennedy writes in Windsor about the 
“resulting injury and indignity”65 of marriage bans or in Obergefell about the 
advantages of “offering symbolic recognition and material benefits to protect 
and nourish the union,”66 he acknowledges both the material and expressive 
aspects of marriage laws. In Windsor, the Supreme Court emphasizes the 
message that unequal treatment conveys: “[I]t tells those couples, and all the 
world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy[,] . . . a second-tier 
marriage. The differentiation demeans the couple . . . .”67 While the Equal 
Protection Clause is less prominent in Obergefell, the language about 
communicating second-class citizenship is not. After explicitly noting that the 
                                                                                                                     
 61 Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social 
Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1275 (2011) (“[T]his Article ultimately concludes that laws 
withholding the term marriage from same-sex couples unconstitutionally convey the 
message of second-class citizenship.”).  
 62 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).  
 63 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“To separate [black 
schoolchildren] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race 
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”).  
 64 For example, rather than explicitly deny any message of inferiority or second-class 
status like it did in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896), the Supreme Court in 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), simply failed to address the expressive 
component of the government’s decision to rely on an employment test it knew black 
applicants failed at four times the rate. Likewise, the Supreme Court never considered in 
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney what messages might be conveyed by a government 
policy that essentially excluded women from higher ranking state jobs. Pers. Adm’r v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
 65 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013). 
 66 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015). 
 67 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. Justice Kennedy’s expressivist language appears again 
when he writes “DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom 
same-sex couples interact, including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy 
than the marriages of others.” Id. at 2696 (emphasis added).  
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harms of same-sex marriage bans were “more than just material burdens,”68 the 
Court held that “laws excluding same-sex couples from the marriage right 
impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter.”69  
Windsor’s holding that the “practical effect of the law here in question [is] 
to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter 
into same-sex marriages”70 could easily be paraphrased to apply to the proposed 
accommodation: “The practical effect of the accommodation here is to impose 
a separate status and so a stigma upon all who seek to enter into same-sex 
marriages.” Accordingly, a federal district court struck down on equal 
protection grounds a Mississippi law allowing county clerks to recuse 
themselves so long as the recusal did not cause any delay, holding that “the 
recusal provision itself deprives LGBT citizens of governmental protection from 
separate treatment . . . . Such treatment viscerally confronts same-sex couples 
with the same message of inferiority and second-class citizenship that was 
rejected [in Windsor and Obergefell].”71 In short, for the government to allow 
public employees to refuse to serve same-sex couples because they condemn the 
union conveys a message of second-class citizenship, even when others step 
in.72 
One rejoinder is that the true message (as well as the true motive) is about 
individual conscience, and therefore accommodating refusals communicates a 
commitment to free speech, not a disregard for LGBT equality. Of course, that 
argument requires several presumptions, any one of which may not be true. The 
first is that providing a marriage license qualifies as speech.73 The second is that 
                                                                                                                     
 68 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 (“This harm results in more than just material 
burdens.”). 
 69 Id. at 2602; see also id. (“It demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them out 
of a central institution of the Nation’s society.”). 
 70 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. 
 71 Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 711 (S.D. Miss. 2016), rev’d on other 
grounds, 860 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2017); see also id. (“‘A law declaring that in general it shall 
be more difficult for one group of citizens to seek aid from the government is itself a denial 
of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.’ There cannot be one set of 
employees to serve the preferred couples and another who is ‘willing’ to serve LGBT citizens 
with a ‘clear conscience,’ as Senator Branning put it.” (citation omitted) (quoting Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996))). 
 72 Cf. Taylor Flynn, Clarion Call or False Alarm: Why Proposed Exemptions to Equal 
Marriage Statutes Return Us to a Religious Understanding of the Public Marketplace, 5 NW. 
J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 236, 241 (2010) (“To be candid, I find myself unnerved by proponents’ 
failure to recognize the dignitary harm at the heart of public refusals to serve historically 
marginalized groups.”); Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-
Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2586 (2015) (“Even 
if the government can provide for affected third parties in alternative ways, these alternatives 
may not shield third parties from dignitary harms.”). 
 73 See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing whether provision of a marriage license by a 
county clerk amounts to expressive conduct). 
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this speech is not pure government speech.74 In any event, discriminatory 
treatment in the name of free speech is still discrimination. While discriminatory 
treatment motivated by animus is worse, discriminatory treatment without 
animus does not reverse the ultimate message, which is that same-sex couples 
do not merit equal respect. It is not clear that any government interest, especially 
a circumscribed interest in protecting a government employee’s semiprivate, 
semigovernmental expressive conduct, suffices to surmount a direct violation of 
the equal protection prohibition against treating some citizens as second-class 
because of a protected characteristic. Under an expressivist theory, therefore, 
accommodating an employee’s refusal to serve is likely barred by the Equal 
Protection Clause.75  
What if, however, the accommodation was behind the scenes and outside 
the public eye? That is, what if it were, first, arranged beforehand, so no couple 
would ever experience a clerk telling them that someone else would be 
providing their license, and second, arranged informally, to avoid the 
widespread publicity that accompanies enacted laws?76 Is there still a message 
if there is no audience to receive it?77 In some ways, this presents the equal 
protection equivalent of the age-old conundrum: if a tree falls in a forest and no 
one hears it, does it still make a sound?  
Perhaps a slightly different hypothetical would help. Imagine a white county 
clerk whose religion teaches that she should never touch a black person lest she 
become contaminated by them. Imagine she seeks a similar accommodation—
beforehand, informally, and behind the scenes. Would the state violate the Equal 
Protection Clause by accommodating her patently racist beliefs?  
The protesting county clerks would no doubt argue that the two religiously 
motivated refusals to serve members of a protected class are not analogous. One 
                                                                                                                     
 74 See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing whether a government employee’s behind-the-
scenes refusal qualifies as government speech because it is “pursuant to official duties”). 
Even if private, the state is not accommodating purely private speech, but speech that is to 
some extent (or to a large extent) the government’s own speech, thereby diminishing its 
entitlement to constitutional protection.  
 75 Moreover, just as Herbert Wechsler’s claim that segregation involved a clash 
between equal competing rights in Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) overlooked that one group was powerful and one subordinated, so 
too with objecting clerks and the LGBT community. See Flynn, supra note 72, at 257–59; 
see also id. at 258 (“Importantly, however, this assumption ignores the subordination 
inherent in state-sponsored permission to discriminate against an unpopular minority.”); cf. 
DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 35 (2008) (“To demean thus 
requires not only that one express disrespect for the equal humanity of the other but also that 
one be in a position such that this expression can subordinate the other.”). 
 76 Or the result of a very public Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim. See Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000bb). 
 77 Cf. Ravitch, supra note 44, at 170 (arguing that “accommodation should be denied 
or revoked when a government official acting in his or her official capacity calls attention to 
the refusal to perform a duty, either through contacting the media or through direct 
confrontation with the citizens he or she refuses to serve”). 
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religious belief, premised on the inferiority of a particular people, is obviously 
discriminatory, while the other, focused on preserving the sanctity of one 
particular type of marriage, is not.78 A preference for one option does not 
necessarily read as discriminatory against other ones. Preferring to send my 
child to a Jewish school does not necessarily denigrate Christians, Muslims, 
Buddhists, Hindus, or Sikhs, for example. However, when there is only one 
other option, and that other option is regularly described as a sin and an 
abomination, it is harder to make the case that it is just a preference for one thing 
rather than discrimination against the other.79  
Obergefell makes clear that the lack of animus does not change the fact that 
denying equal access communicates an unconstitutional message.80 Justice 
Kennedy does not assume, as the previous paragraph suggests, that the beliefs 
of those who oppose same-sex marriage are linked to a hierarchical world view 
that the government should not endorse in any way. On the contrary, Justice 
Kennedy depicts religious objectors’ traditional beliefs as “principles” that are 
“fulfilling” and “central to their lives and faiths” and the traditional family as 
“the family structure they have long revered.”81  
Nonetheless, although the First Amendment may protect individuals’ right 
to discuss and debate these beliefs—“those who believe allowing same-sex 
marriage is proper or indeed essential, whether as a matter of religious 
conviction or secular belief, may engage those who disagree with their view in 
an open and searching debate”82—the government may not act on them: “The 
Constitution, however, does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from 
marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.”83 Thus, 
the Supreme Court underscores that denying access to marriage “on the same 
terms” need not be motivated by animus in order to deprive same-sex couples 
of equal dignity.84  
                                                                                                                     
 78 Cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2708 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]o defend traditional marriage is not to condemn, demean, or humiliate those who would 
prefer other arrangements . . . .”). 
 79 James M. Oleske, Jr., The Evolution of Accommodation: Comparing the Unequal 
Treatment of Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriages, 50 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 123 (2015) (“[N]obody should be mistaken about the underlying 
reason for their opposition to same-sex marriage: they ‘disapprove of homosexuality.’”). 
 80 See supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text (discussing message conveyed by 
government’s unequal treatment). 
 81 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (“The First Amendment ensures 
that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the 
principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep 
aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered.”).  
 82 Id. at 2607. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Justice Kennedy uses the term “equal dignity” in both Windsor and Obergefell. See, 
e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (“[DOMA] interfere[s] with the equal dignity of same-sex 
marriages”); Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608 (“[Same-sex couples] ask for equal dignity in the 
eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.”). 
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The Court made this point even more plainly when it asserted: 
Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion 
based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises, and 
neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here. But when that sincere, 
personal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the 
necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an 
exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is 
then denied.85 
Of course, Obergefell involved the open and complete denial of marriage, 
unlike the behind-the-scenes accommodations at issue here. Still, one could 
conclude that for same-sex couples, the issue is ultimately the same: “They ask 
for equal dignity in the eyes of the law.”86 Therefore, the answer given by the 
Supreme Court should be the same: “The Constitution grants them that right.”87  
IV. CONCLUSION: THE CLASH OF EXPRESSIONS 
In conclusion, I would like to flag one last complication that arises when a 
government employee refuses to issue a marriage license. I have emphasized 
that the government’s accommodation of this refusal has an expressive 
component, and therefore raises serious equal protection questions. At the same 
time, I have also suggested that issuing a marriage license is not sufficiently 
expressive to trigger free speech protection for government employees. How 
can both these claims be true? Either issuing a marriage license is expressive or 
it is not.  
One response is that both claims cannot be true, and that providing marriage 
licenses is expressive in both contexts. Indeed, anticipating this view, much of 
my analysis assumes that both public employees’ and the government’s 
expressive interests are in play. A slightly different response agrees that they are 
both expressive, but that in both cases the expression is the government’s, and 
therefore the employee’s rights are simply not implicated.88 The expression may 
be the government’s because a public employee performing her official duties 
is always the government.89 Or it may be the government’s because even if a 
public employee fulfilling her official responsibilities and the government are 
                                                                                                                     
 85 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 86 Id. at 2608. 
 87 Id. 
 88 When the government grants a license, it tells same-sex couples that they are of equal 
worth and dignity; when the government accommodates a refusal, it tells them the contrary. 
 89 While the focus of this Essay is on public employees’ free speech rights, a parallel 
argument could apply to their religious rights. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, 
Government Employee Religion, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming Feb. 2018) (imagining a 
government employee religion jurisprudence based on existing government employee 
speech jurisprudence).  
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not always conflated, they are here, when a public employee’s official duties of 
providing marriage licenses involves, among other things,90 contact with the 
public. Yet another response is that even if there is a message that can be 
attributed to the public employee as a private individual, it is not the one the 
employee claims. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the potential expansiveness of free speech 
expressive conduct and equal protection expressive state action differs, and this 
too might inform how to read the public employee’s provision of a license or 
the state’s refusal or accommodation of a refusal. Granting free speech 
significance to the provision of services greatly expands what counts as 
expressive conduct, and an overly broad understanding of expressive conduct 
risks nullifying the distinction between speech and conduct. A very expansive 
category also risks diluting potential protection for that category.91 Granting 
equal protection significance to the government’s acts does not carry the same 
risks, in part because the Equal Protection Clause is triggered only when the 
equal dignity of a suspect class is involved.92  
In the end, though, even if both are expressive in the way each side claims, 
it may be that the state’s interest simply outweighs the individual’s because the 
Equal Protection Clause does not tolerate any “interference with the equal 
dignity of same-sex marriages.”93 
  
                                                                                                                     
 90 Among those other things might be the fact that the government employee is acting 
as a gatekeeper to something over which the government has a monopoly, i.e., marriage 
licenses.  
 91 Cf. William P. Marshall, Diluting Constitutional Rights: Rethinking “Rethinking 
State Action,” 80 NW. U. L. REV. 558, 567 (1985) (“The more broadly rights are drawn, the 
more difficult it becomes to enforce those rights stringently.”). 
 92 In other words, this antisubordination approach (as opposed to colorblindness 
approach) to equal protection is triggered when a suspect class (rather than a suspect 
classification) is involved. Cf. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (“Especially against a long 
history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to 
marry works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays and 
lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them.”). 
 93 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). 

